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  8  Cosmic Evolution and Evil 
 Christopher  Southgate 
 Introduction to Cosmic Theodicy 
 This chapter will concern itself with what the sciences tell us about 
the structure and unfolding of the cosmos and the implications of those 
accounts of natural processes for the problem of evil. I shall be writing 
as a Christian theologian about the problems evil poses for a Christian 
understanding of the loving character of God, confessed as the creator 
and redeemer of the world. 
 I shall take the term  ‘ evil ’ in its technical sense in this debate, 
as connoting the suffering of sentient beings (both human and non- 
human), and the infl iction of such suffering by conscious, freely choos-
ing agents. So wicked actions constitute only a proportion of what may 
be regarded as evil in this broader sense. Indeed, the most difficult areas 
of the problem of evil for the Christian theologian concern that suffer-
ing which cannot be attributed to the action of freely choosing agents 
and must therefore be attributed in some sense to the activity of God 
as creator. 
 Theodicy is the general term for efforts to reconcile the loving char-
acter of God with evils in the world. For the purposes of this chapter 
I shall refer to theodicy in respect of suffering caused by the natural pro-
cesses of the universe as  ‘ cosmic theodicy ’ . This will include suffering 
caused to human beings by natural disasters and by disease, be it inher-
ited or caused by parasites or other pathogens, and also suffering caused 
to other sentient beings by predation, competition, and disease, leading 
at times to actual species extinction. In focusing on evil caused by nat-
ural processes, I recognize that this is often exacerbated by human cru-
elty or neglect. For example, the effects of the Indian Ocean tsunami of 
2004 were made worse by the lack of an early- warning system, such as 
already existed in the Pacifi c, by the destruction of mangrove swamps on 
the coasts, and by the civil war in Banda- Ace. Yet there remains a very 
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substantial amount of evil that must be assigned to the natural processes 
of the world. 
 Currently, the most interesting area of this subject concerns argu-
ments that suggest that the suffering of sentient creatures is somehow a 
necessary element in the arising of values such as we see in this world. 
I  shall evaluate these arguments and indicate where I  think theology 
needs to supplement them. 
 But before embarking on such an analysis I  need to acknowledge 
the power of what might be called  ‘ anti- theodicy ’ . Some very impor-
tant thinkers have rejected any sort of calculus by which God ’ s action 
in allowing evils within creation can be justifi ed. In their different ways 
such scholars as Kenneth Surin, Terrence Tilley, D. Z. Phillips, and John 
Swinton all make eloquent cases that such calculation is at best counter- 
productive and at worst downright evil in itself. 1  For Phillips, for exam-
ple, it is simply an error to write of the divine as though God were a 
moral agent like human moral agents. For Tilley, theorizing about evil 
may itself prove to be a source of evil. 
 For Surin and Swinton, priority must rather be given to listening to 
the voices of the victims of evil, to the alleviation of their suffering, and 
to resisting those who cause it. In my own work I have focused on the suf-
ferings of non- human creatures, caused by other such creatures, over the 
many millennia for which sentient creatures capable of suffering have 
been victims of aspects of the evolutionary process. These victims do not 
have  ‘ voices ’ in any ordinary sense, nor can their suffering necessarily 
be alleviated, nor is it straightforward to think of resisting its causes. 
Nevertheless, this is a huge area of creaturely suffering that constitutes 
a charge against the goodness of God. So there are clearly aspects of this 
problem that escape at least some of the critique of the anti- theodicists. 
 The Scriptures, which are the natural starting point for the Christian 
theologian seeking to discern the ways of God with the world, offer curi-
ously little help to the philosophical theodicist. They are certainly not 
interested in proving either the existence of God or the logical compat-
ibility of belief in a loving God with the existence of profound suffer-
ing. They are not afraid to protest against God, as in the long central 
narrative of the Book of Job, or to cry out in the sort of lament that 
is full of protest, as in many of the Psalms. Indeed, it might be argued 
  1   K.  Surin ,  Theology and the Problem of Evil ( Oxford :  Basil Blackwell ,  1986) ;  T.  Tilley , 
 The Evils of Theodicy ( Georgetown, VA:  Georgetown University Press ,  1991) ;  D.    Z. 
 Phillips ,  The Problem of Evil and the Problem of God ( London :  SCM Press ,  2004) ;  J. 
 Swinton ,  Raging with Compassion: Pastoral Responses to the Problem of Evil ( Grand 
Rapids, MI, and Cambridge :  Eerdmans ,  2007) . 
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(pursuing a line of thought from Terry Eagleton 2  ) that the question  ‘ why ’ , 
which shrieks loud on the lips of sufferers and echoes long in the ears of 
Christian ministers after natural disasters, is not a philosophical request 
for a reason at all. It is rather something much more primal, a fusion of 
protest and lament. 
 Insofar as the Christian Scriptures do offer any hints as to the reason 
for suffering, these hints, disturbingly to the modern sensibility, sug-
gest that suffering can be an instrument of the purposes of God. In the 
Old Testament, God sometimes sends suffering through the medium of 
what we would now see as natural processes, as punishment for sin, or 
as part of a divine plan. The story of the plagues of Egypt (and indeed the 
destruction of the Egyptian army at the Reed Sea) is the classic example. 
Even the New Testament is by no means free of the notion that suffer-
ing serves the purposes of God (Jn 9.1 – 3; 11.7 – 14; Rom. 5.2 – 5; Col. 1.24; 
1. Pet. 3.17 – 18). At the centre of the Christian confession is the convic-
tion, never explained though endlessly theorized over, that  ‘ the Son of 
Man must suffer … and be killed ’ (Mk 8.31) 3  and that on that death rests 
the salvation of the world. So Jesus ’ innocent suffering, which came to 
be seen as the redemptive suffering of the divine Son, is understood to be 
instrumental in the purposes of God. I return to this point later. 
 The question raised by these initial refl ections is:  What should a 
Christian theodicist attempt? Some philosophical theologians, such as 
Richard Swinburne and Alvin Plantinga, have sought to provide logical 
demonstrations of the goodness of God in the face of evil, demonstra-
tions that would convince someone of no faith. 4  Michael J. Murray has 
sought to consider what arguments might qualify as such demonstra-
tions in respect of  ‘ nature red in tooth and claw ’ . 5  I am not convinced 
that such arguments are very generative. It is not my experience that 
those whose preconceptions run counter to the compatibility of suf-
fering and divine love are convinced by philosophical analyses. Rather, 
I prefer to think of theodicy as an exploration, from within the confess-
ing community, of the ways of God with the world, given a belief in 
divine sovereignty and divine love. I make no distinction here between 
 ‘ theodicies ’ and  ‘ defences ’ , since I am not convinced that these terms are 
clearly distinguished in the literature. 
  2   T.  Eagleton ,  On Evil ( New Haven , CT:  Yale University Press ,  2010) . 
  3   All biblical quotations are from the New Revised Standard Version. 
  4   R.  Swinburne ,  Providence and the Problem of Evil ( Oxford :  Oxford University Press , 
 1998) ;  A.  Plantinga ,  God, Freedom and Evil ( Grand Rapids, MI :  Eerdmans ,  1974) . 
  5   M.    J.  Murray ,  Nature Red in Tooth and Claw: Theism and the Problem of Animal 
Suffering ( Oxford :  Oxford University Press ,  2008) . 
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 In 2007, Andrew Robinson and I published an analysis of different 
types of  ‘ good- harm analysis ’ (GHA). 6  We pointed out that all attempts 
at rational theodicy tend to involve an aspect of balancing harms to crea-
tures against goods that might arise in connection with those harms. 
This balancing will tend to be of one of three kinds. 
 Property- consequence GHAs :  a consequence of the existence of a 
good, as a property of a particular being or system, is the possibility 
that possession of this good leads to it causing harms. 
 Developmental GHAs : the good is a goal that can only develop through 
a process which includes the possibility (or necessity) of harm. 
 Constitutive GHAs : The existence of a good is inherently, constitu-
tively inseparable from the experience of harm or suffering. 
 A familiar example of the fi rst kind would be the free- will defence to 
moral evil. God is taken, in this defence, to have endowed humans with 
the property of freedom, the consequence of which is that humans often 
commit evil. Developmental arguments may be most pertinent to cos-
mic theodicy; it could for example be held that God instituted the pro-
cess of evolution because it would give rise to certain goals, although 
harms were likely, or indeed certain, to arise. Constitutive arguments 
are the most subtle and elusive. One way to read the ever- problematic 
story of the sacrifi ce of Isaac in Gen. 22 would be that only in the crisis 
of Mount Moriah, sacrifi cial knife in his hand at God ’ s command, does 
Abraham come to know the true character of the divine love. 
 Three Proposals in Cosmic Theodicy 
 I now proceed to consider three moves in cosmic theodicy by impor-
tant thinkers at the interface of science and theology. All three argue in 
different ways for a  ‘ package deal ’ understanding, for a necessary con-
nection between positive values arising within creation, such as beauty, 
creaturely ingenuity and diversity, and negatives or disvalues, in par-
ticular suffering and extinction. Robert J. Russell has been at pains to 
insist that the basic structure of the physical universe as God has cre-
ated it, in particular the Second Law of Thermodynamics, is a source 
  6   C.  Southgate and  A.  Robinson ,  “ Varieties of Theodicy: An Exploration of Responses 
to the Problem of Evil based on a Typology of Good- Harm Analyses . ” In  Physics 
and Cosmology: Scientifi c Perspectives on the Problem of Evil . Ed.  N.  Murphy ,  R.   J. 
 Russell , and  W.   R.  Stoeger SJ ( Vatican City and Berkeley, CA:  Vatican Observatory and 
Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences, 2007) ,  67 – 90 . 
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both of creaturely possibilities and of creaturely suffering. 7  (Put at its 
simplest, the Second Law states that the overall degree of disorder in 
a physical system will always tend to increase. This is the underlying 
reason why biological organisms, in general, continually need to take 
on nutrients and why they ultimately decay.) The nature of thermody-
namics makes possible increases in complexity in the biological world, 
but it also makes inevitable decay and death and the life- strategies that 
follow from that. 
 John Polkinghorne has advanced what he has called the  ‘ free- process ’ 
defence  –  ‘ all of created nature is allowed to be itself according to its 
kind, just as human beings are allowed to be according to their kind ’ . 8  
At fi rst sight this might be supposed to be a property- consequence argu-
ment by analogy with the free- will defence. The version of the argument 
recently offered (in other terms) by Elizabeth Johnson would indeed be of 
this form. It is a good  – in her terms  – that physical processes have their 
own autonomy and cause the cosmos to unfold according to their free-
dom. Perhaps surprisingly given her neo- Thomist framework, she wants 
to insist that these free processes are not instruments of the divine pur-
pose. 9  But if this is the case, then it is not clear that this freedom is a good, 
certainly not a good that could be weighed against the harms that natural 
processes cause (for example through earthquakes, volcanoes, etc.). 
 Rather, the free- process defence is most helpfully seen as develop-
mental  – the freedom of physical processes is a good because it gives rise 
to the evolutionary development of certain values on Earth, values that, 
it may be presumed, God desired. So the tectonic processes that give rise 
to earthquakes have had an essential role in distributing and recycling 
nutrients to allow this to become and continue to be a planet fruitful 
for life. The asteroid impact that led to the extinction of the dinosaurs 
made possible the rise of the mammals and with that the possibility of 
intelligent life, culminating in modern human beings. 
 Holmes Rolston III has made a number of telling contributions to 
the debate. Particularly important are, fi rst, his exposition of why disval-
ues in nature are closely bound up with values and why predation is nec-
essary for complex life, 10  and second, his rejection of the notion that the 
  7   R.    J.  Russell ,  “ Natural Theodicy in an Evolutionary Context:  The Need for an 
Eschatology of New Creation . ” In  Cosmology: from Alpha to Omega by  R.   J.  Russell 
( Minneapolis, MN:  Fortress Press ,  2008 ),  249 – 72 . 
  8   J.  Polkinghorne ,  Exploring Reality:  The Intertwining of Science and Religion 
( London :  SPCK ,  2005 ),  143 . 
  9   E.  Johnson ,  Ask the Beasts: Darwin and the God of Love ( London :  Bloomsbury ,  2014) . 
  10   H.  Rolston , III,  “ Disvalues in Nature , ”  The Monist  75 ( 1992 ):  250 – 78 . 
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natural world stands in need of redemption. For Rolston, the processes 
by which the matter of a dead creature is recycled through other organ-
isms does itself constitute redemption. 11  I  return to the subject of 
redemption in what follows. 
 We are now beginning to have a sense of what has become a central 
issue in the contemporary debate in cosmic theodicy. Aspects of the nat-
ural processes of the world are profoundly ambiguous  – they necessarily 
generate harms, be it the 230,000 human beings killed by the tectonic 
movement that caused the Indian Ocean tsunami or the myriad crea-
tures torn apart by predators over the millennia of evolutionary history. 
At the same time they also generate values, a world fruitful for life, and 
a process (natural selection) that refi nes the characteristics of creatures, 
leading to the biosphere we know today. A number of scholars writing 
in this area want to suggest that certain types of natural law and process, 
be it the Second Law, plate tectonics, or natural selection, are necessary 
for the development of these values, in other words that God could not 
have created this sort of world without this extent of suffering. This was, 
even for God,  the only way in which to give rise to the values we see in 
this world. Aside from Russell, Polkinghorne, and Rolston, others who 
have written along these lines include Robin Attfi eld, Nancey Murphy, 
and myself. 12  The notion of a package deal  – the values cannot be had 
without the disvalues  – is explicitly articulated by Niels Gregersen and 
Denis Alexander. 13  
  11   H.  Rolston , III,  “ Does Evolution need to be Redeemed? ”  Zygon  26 ( 1994 ):  205 – 29 . 
  12   R.  Attfi eld ,  Creation, Evolution and Meaning ( Aldershot :  Ashgate ,  2006) ;  N. 
 Murphy ,  “ Science and the Problem of Evil: Suffering as a By- Product of a Finely- 
Tuned Cosmos . ” In  Physics and Cosmology: Scientifi c Perspectives on the Problem 
of Evil . Ed.  N.  Murphy ,  R.  J.  Russell , and  W.  R.  Stoeger SJ ( Vatican City and Berkeley, 
CA:  Vatican Observatory and Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences) ,  131 – 51 ; 
 C.  Southgate ,  The Groaning of Creation: God, Evolution and the Problem of Evil 
( Louisville, KY :  Westminster John Knox Press ,  2008) , ch. 3. Two articles criticiz-
ing the  ‘ the only- way ’ argument have appeared since this chapter was drafted. They 
are  N.  W.  O ’ Halloran SJ,  “ Cosmic Alienation and the Origin of Evil: Rejecting the 
 ‘ Only Way ’ Option , ”  Theology and Science ,  13 : 1 ( 2015 ):  43 – 63; and  M.  Wahlberg , 
 “ Was Evolution the Only Possible Way for God to Make Autonomous Creatures? 
Examination of an Argument in Evolutionary Theodicy , ”  Int. J. Philos. Relig .  77 
( 2015 ):  37 – 51 . O ’ Halloran ’ s advocacy of a primordial spiritual rebellion,  ‘ a higher 
organizing principle of disorder and evil within the cosmos ’ , is vulnerable to the 
same concerns indicated later in my chapter in respect of Lloyd ’ s work. However, 
Wahlberg ’ s article is very helpful in requiring  ‘ only- way ’ theorists to clarify exactly 
what it was that God could not know or do that made evolution a necessary means 
of creating creaturely selves. 
  13   N.   H.  Gregersen ,  “ The Cross of Christ in an Evolutionary World , ”  Dialog: A Journal of 
Theology ,  40 . 3 ( 2001 ):  192 – 207 ;  D.  Alexander ,  Creation or Evolution  – Do We Have to 
Choose? ( Oxford :  Monarch ,  2008) . 
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 Two questions then arise. First, what is this constraint on the power 
of God? Why was it not possible for God to create in some other, less 
suffering- fi lled way? Second, is this assertion  – that this was the only 
or the best way that God could give rise to a world containing beauty, 
ingenuity, and diversity  – sufficient to constitute a theodicy? I return to 
these questions after considering how what I am calling cosmic theodicy 
would have been tackled in the tradition. 
 Traditional Theodicies Based on a Fall- Event 
 An enormous weight of Christian thought has rested on the notion that 
disvalues in the world, be they the toil of human life or the struggle of 
other creatures, are the product of the fi rst human sin, as described in 
Genesis 3. This is still the refl ex response of most Christians, and it is 
an urgent task for theological education to convey the inadequacy of this 
answer. The answer is problematic biblically, because even within the 
Genesis narrative itself the curse of  Chapter 3 seems to be repented of 
at the end of  Chapter 8 . 14  And there is very little sign in the rest of the 
Hebrew Bible of the notion of a primordially corrupted world. 15  (Rather, 
the processes of the world, including predation, are affirmed in such 
important passages on the theology of creation as Ps. 104 and Job 38 – 41.) 
The notion of a  ‘ cosmic fall ’ is also deeply problematic in the light of the 
scientifi c record. There is not the slightest evidence that humans ever 
lived harmoniously with all other creatures in a vegetarian paradise as 
depicted in Genesis 2. Moreover, predation and disease preceded human 
life by hundreds of millions of years. 
 The only refuge from these arguments from science is either to sup-
pose that Eden was a special zone, insulated from the rest of the world, 
or that some sort of time reversal occurred. The fi rst strategy can be 
found in Stephen Webb ’ s  The Dome of Eden and the second in William 
Dembski ’ s  The End of Christianity . 16  Webb ’ s picture does not seem alto-
gether consistent as to the extent of evil powers corrupting the creation 
and arrives at a fanciful picture for which there is no textual evidence. 
Dembski contrives a very elaborate argument about time but arrives at a 
  14   The work of Bethany Sollereder (Ph.D. thesis, University of Exeter, 2014) brings this 
out particularly clearly. 
  15   J.  Bimson ,  “ Reconsidering a  “ Cosmic Fall, ’ ”  Science and Christian Belief  18 ( 2006 ): 
 63 – 81 . 
  16   S.  Webb ,  The Dome of Eden: A New Solution to the Problem of Creation and Evolution 
( Eugene, OR :  Wipf and Stock ,  2010) ;  W.   A.  Dembski ,  The End of Christianity: Finding 
a Good God in an Evil World ( Nashville, TN:  Broadman and Holman ,  2009) . 
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position that is no theodicy at all. His God imposes suffering on myriad 
creatures because humans will one day sin. 
 Some scholars who accept the inadequacy of assigning disvalues 
in the creation to human sin nevertheless want to distance God from 
the violence and suffering of creation. Michael Lloyd is an example of a 
scholar who defends an angelic fall as the cause of suffering in creation. 17  
This view is deeply difficult theologically, not only because of the lack 
of biblical evidence that the world is so corrupted, but also because it 
assigns to spiritual entities opposed to God more power than Christian 
theology has been willing to concede. God ’ s sovereignty is severely com-
promised in schemes in which God set out to create straw- eating lions 
and was prevented from doing so. Furthermore, it is deeply difficult for 
theology in conversation with science to dissect out some elements of 
the physical world and assign those to malefi c infl uences while attrib-
uting all beauty, order, and creativity to God. The whole essence of the 
scientifi c picture as it has emerged since the nineteenth century is that 
it is the same processes  – tectonics, creaturely decay, mutation, natural 
selection, to name only a few  – that generate the suffering as also gener-
ate the beauty, ingenuity and diversity of the world of creatures. 
 A more sophisticated version of a  ‘ primordial fall ’ is found in the 
work of Neil Messer. 18  Messer ’ s reading of Karl Barth encourages him to 
invoke a mysterious counter- force,  Das Nichtige (nothingness), which 
prevents God from effecting the creation God desired. This formulation 
is subject to all the scientifi c and theological problems noted earlier and 
is in any case a contestable reading of Barth. 19  But it is important to note 
the theological motivation behind Messer ’ s account (and Lloyd ’ s). These 
authors cannot associate the God of Jesus Christ with the creation of 
processes that involve, indeed that seem to depend on, violence. This 
shows that this problem of cosmic theodicy cannot be treated in isola-
tion from a whole range of other theological trajectories. And it must 
  17   M.  Lloyd ,  “ Are Animals Fallen? ” In  Animals on the Agenda: Questions about Animals 
in Theology and Ethics . Ed.  A.  Linzey and  D.  Yamamoto ( London :  SCM Press ,  1998) ; 
 “ The Humanity of Fallenness. ” In  Grace and Truth in a Secular Age . Ed. T. Bradshaw 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1998). 
  18   N.  Messer ,  “ Natural Evil after Darwin . ” In  Theology after Darwin . Ed.  M. S.  Northcott 
and  R. J.  Berry ( Milton Keynes :  Paternoster ,  2009) ,  139 – 54 . This thinking is taken up 
in some important work on animal theology  – see  D.  Clough ,  On Animals: Volume 
I: Systematic Theology ( London :  Continuum ,  2012) . 
  19   For further analysis, see  C.  Southgate ,  “ Re- reading Genesis, John and Job: A Christian ’ s 
Response to Darwinism , ”  Zygon  46 . 2 ( 2011 ):   365 – 90 ;  “ God ’ s Creation Wild and 
Violent, and Our Care of Other Animals, ”  Perspectives on Science and Christian 
Faith 67 (2015): 245 – 53. For a different theological approach, see  C.  Southgate ,  “ Divine 
Glory in a Darwinian World , ”  Zygon  49 . 4 ( 2014 ):  784 – 807 . 
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be acknowledged that Messer poses a hard question about  ‘ only way ’ 
arguments such as the ones that I began to discuss earlier. Why must we 
picture God as constrained to act in a way that makes violence intrinsic 
to creation and necessitates a vast extent of creaturely suffering? The 
difficulty of that position persuades scholars such as Messer and Lloyd 
to seek alternatives that, as I have indicated, are themselves profoundly 
problematic. (A further, very problematic move currently being explored 
is to suppose that a whole range of other animals commit sin. 20  ) 
 Delving further into Messer ’ s position leads one to ask whether this 
counter- force he postulates is a conscious agency (like Lloyd ’ s fallen 
angels) or a part of the logical fabric of reality. If the former, then Messer ’ s 
view seems to default to the sort of dualist position in which God can-
not overcome the infl uence on creation of an evil counter- deity, a view 
that the Christian tradition has steadfastly resisted. If the latter, then his 
argument seems to acquire a congruence with only- way arguments in 
which the disvalues in creation become a necessary concomitant of the 
values. His  ‘ Nichtige ’ argument is a theological guess at a constraint on 
God, drawing its strength from Barth ’ s not- wholly- clear language, and 
beyond that from the old tradition that evil has no real existence but is 
only a privation of the good. Only- way arguments, in contrast, are scien-
tifi cally informed guesses at a constraint on God, drawing their strength 
from the contemplation of the world as science describes it and the infer-
ence that if God could have created without these suffering- fi lled natural 
processes, God would have done so. 
 There are other arguments analogous to Messer ’ s postulate of a mys-
terious force or factor leading to an ambiguous creation. This type of 
argument may be deemed an appeal to  ‘ mysterious fallenness ’ . Celia 
Deane- Drummond, likewise reluctant to accept that God might be impli-
cated in the creation of violent processes, writes of  ‘ Shadow Sophia ’ , the 
underside of the wisdom in creation. 21  Yet it is never clarifi ed what this 
infl uence is. Likewise, Nicola Hoggard Creegan has written of the dis-
values in creation as being like the  ‘ tares ’ in the parable of the wheat and 
the tares. However, in the parable, the tares are sown by an  ‘ enemy ’ (Mt. 
13.24 – 30), whereas Hoggard Creegan is reluctant to say what the origin 
of the disvalue is. 22  
  20   Clough,  Animal Theology ; J. Moritz,  ‘ ‘ Animal Suffering, Evolution, and the Origins of 
Evil, ”  Zygon 49.2 (2014): 348 – 80. 
  21   C.  Deane- Drummond ,  Christ and Evolution:  Wonder and Wisdom ( Minneapolis, 
MN :  Fortress Press ,  2009) ,  185 – 91 . 
  22   N.  Hoggard Creegan ,  Animal Suffering and the Problem of Evil ( New York :   Oxford 
University Press ,  2013) . 
use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781107295278.009
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Exeter, on 29 Oct 2019 at 10:11:24, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of
156 Christopher Southgate
156
 It should be clear by now that cosmic processes that lead inevitably 
to creaturely suffering, as well as to all sorts of values, constitute a deep 
problem in the theology of creation. Delicate choices need to be made, 
none of which is problem-free. Messer himself contrasts theologies that 
privilege Christian doctrine, among which he would list his own cosmic 
theodicy, with those that in his view privilege science over doctrine. 23  
While his taxonomy of interactions in the science – religion debate is use-
ful as a rhetorical device, the interactions themselves are more com-
plex. Scientifi c conclusions vary from those that are highly provisional 
to those (like evolution by natural selection) that are strongly supported 
by a range of robust data accumulated over a long period. Doctrinal posi-
tions often rest on scriptural passages that can be approached from very 
different strategies in biblical interpretation. For example, Messer ’ s key 
passage, the account of the peaceable kingdom in Is. 11, can be under-
stood in a range of ways, some cosmic and futuristic, some political 
and contemporary. For an account of the interpretative issues around 
the classic New Testament passages on the redemption of creation and 
of interpreters ’ strategies of privileging one type of text and using it to 
explicate others, see Horrell and colleagues (2010). 24  Also, predictions 
about the future (as for example regarding the ultimate fate of the uni-
verse) have a very different status in the debate from accounts of past 
events. There is an inherent uncertainty about the future that places it 
in a different category from the past or yet the present. In the case under 
discussion, the account of why there exist natural processes that have 
caused and do cause great suffering, robust science encounters theology 
at its most tentative, as theology must be in discussing the problem of 
evil. There is thus good reason for taking the main lines of the scientifi c 
conclusions with the utmost seriousness. 
 ‘ Only Way ’ Arguments 
 I return now to the argument we began to map at the beginning of this 
chapter, namely that suffering- causing natural processes are necessary to 
the realization of values within creation. I phrase this argument as fol-
lows:  ‘ This was the only, or at least the best, process by which creaturely 
values of beauty, diversity and simplicity could arise ’ . 25  
  23   N.  Messer ,  Selfi sh Genes and Christian Ethics: Theological and Ethical Refl ections on 
Evolutionary Biology ( London :  SCM Press ,  2007) ,  48 – 62 . 
  24   D.   G.  Horrell ,  C.  Hunt , and  C.  Southgate ,  Greening Paul: Re- Reading the Apostle in a 
Time of Ecological Crisis ( Waco, TX:  Baylor University Press ,  2010) . 
  25   Southgate,  Groaning of Creation , 48. 
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 The key questions this argument raises are: 
 1.  What is this constraint on God? and 
 2.  Is such an argument enough of a theodicy? 
 First, I  consider the nature of the constraint. According to usual 
Christian understandings of God ’ s power, that power is only limited by 
logical constraint  – God cannot make 2 + 2 equal 5 or the ratio of diam-
eter to circumference of a circle to be other than 3.14159. It is not possi-
ble, at our current level of knowledge, to show that the constraint in the 
only- way argument is a logical constraint. Nevertheless, it makes com-
mon sense to a scientist. It is hard to imagine a universe not governed by 
the Second Law of Thermodynamics. It is hard to imagine (outside the 
script of  Star Trek ) a chemistry for life fundamentally different from the 
one we know on earth. It is hard to imagine an evolutionary process in 
which natural selection is not a very signifi cant factor. But I am grateful 
to Dr Mark Ian Thomas Robson for pointing out that a Lamarckian uni-
verse, based on the inheritance of behaviours acquired during an organ-
ism ’ s lifetime,  is imaginable. The question would then be, is it plausible 
that such a universe would actually  ‘ work ’ and have a better balance 
of goods and harms given what would need to change to neutralize the 
possibilities of natural selection? 
 Many hypothetical universes could be constructed, but it is not 
demonstrable that Attfi eld is wrong 26  and that there exists a type of uni-
verse that would give rise to a better balance of values against disvalues. 
It cannot be shown that this is a logical truth. The guess that God could 
no more dream into being a completely different sort of life- bearing uni-
verse than a square circle cannot be proven, but it is a reasonable hunch 
that it might be so. As we have seen, the theological alternatives to only- 
way arguments are not attractive. But only- way arguments leave the 
Christian theodicist in an uncomfortable position, having to assert that 
God, in the divine desire to create, was constrained to create processes to 
which suffering was intrinsic in pursuit of ends to which suffering was 
instrumental. I  indicated in my opening comments on Scripture that 
instrumental suffering is not as foreign to the Christian imagination as 
some thinkers would like it to be. But it cannot be the end of the story, 
any more than Calvary was the end of Christ ’ s story. 
 It seems to me that as Christians puzzle out the ways of God with 
the world, those who want to defend an orthodox faith that insists on 
the unity of creation and redemption must suppose not one but two 
  26   Attfi eld,  Creation, Evolution and Meaning , ch. 6. 
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constraints on God. The fi rst is the one I  introduced earlier, that God 
creates under some not- wholly- comprehensible constraint, such that a 
world evolving by natural selection, and therefore necessarily involving 
the suffering of sentient creatures, is the only sort of world in which the 
values represented by complex and diverse life could arise. The second 
constraint on God, amply familiar from Christian teaching, though still 
not clearly or univocally understood, is the necessity, oft- repeated in the 
New Testament, that Jesus should have to endure degrading execution to 
release, fi nally and fully, the redemptive purposes of God into the world. 
 The fi rst of these constraints is unfamiliar to most Christians. The 
second is routinely confessed in various ways throughout the Church. 
But I would submit that they are comparable mysteries  – indeed, if any-
thing, the fi rst is easier to understand than the second, since the fi rst 
has the intuitions of the natural sciences to commend it, whereas the 
intuitions of a culture based on a sacrifi cial system are remote from us. 
Both carry that difficult sense that suffering might be instrumental to 
the divine purpose that I noted earlier. 
 To contemplate God in relation to the natural world is to contem-
plate both immense, staggering, unimaginable power and at the same 
time a powerlessness we cannot quite fathom either  – the creation 
we so delight in and wonder at cannot arise all at once but only by an 
immensely long birthing, full, in Paul ’ s word in Romans 8.20, of  ‘ futil-
ity ’ . And the redemption of the world cannot be magicked either but 
only arises out of the sacrifi ce of the divine Son. 
 Having set the only- way argument in more of a philosophical and 
theological context, it remains to consider our second question:  Is it 
enough to point to such a constraint in order to reconcile the loving 
character of God with the nature of this suffering- fi lled world? The dif-
fi culty with a theodicy that simply asserts that this is the best sort of 
system God could have created is that such theodicy describes a God 
who is the creator of systems but not a God who is in loving relationship 
with creatures. It is my view, therefore, that the best contemporary cos-
mic theodicies must start from a version of the only- way argument, but 
they must go on to make other moves that are more focused on God ’ s 
relationship with the individual creature. 
 The Role of Divine Redemption 
in Cosmic Theodicy 
 Russell has made a careful analysis of the options in what we are calling 
cosmic theodicy and concludes that none of them is satisfactory without 
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a redemptive dimension. 27  We noted already that Rolston offers such a 
dimension in supposing that the cycles of nutrition constitute redemp-
tion of the dead creature. The impala calf torn apart by hyenas is for 
Rolston redeemed by the nourishment they and the bacteria in their guts 
extract from its corpse. But this, once again, is an argument at the level 
of the system and not the individual creature. 
 How then is the impala calf to experience the meaning of God ’ s 
love? Only via a redemption beyond this present world, a redemption 
in the form of some sort of new life in the fi nal  ‘ new creation ’ at the 
eschaton. To include an eschatological dimension to cosmic theodicy is, 
as Russell shows, a necessary complement to only- way type arguments. 
If the love of God is shown in the re- creation of lives  – at least those that 
have not known fullness of life  – then the challenge to that love from 
suffering seems to retreat, and it once again becomes possible to stress 
God ’ s love for the individual creature. 28  
 However, the challenge returns in a different form. Because the pos-
sibility of such a new creation, in which (in the traditional visions we 
are offered in passages such as Is. 11; Rev. 21.1 – 4) there is no more pain, 
begs the question  – why did God not just create in this way in the fi rst 
instance? This is where a theodicy that is considering the suffering of 
all sentient creatures and not just mentally competent self- conscious 
humans must reject a straightforward appeal to  ‘ Irenaean ’ argument, 
to the initial creation as a school in which individual creatures learn 
virtue. 29  So much of the suffering that concerns the cosmic theodi-
cist is of creatures who are not in a position to learn from the experi-
ence, because they are physically torn apart or their lives are otherwise 
destroyed (e.g. by cataclysm, chronic disease, torture, or profound abuse). 
 The logic of the only- way argument is that particular sorts of values, 
embodied in creaturely selves, could only arise (or could best arise) through 
the operation of natural processes such as we see in this world. The chal-
lenge of the question, why did God not just create heaven?  – posed for 
example by Wildman 30   – necessitates an extension of the argument, as 
follows:
  27   Russell,  “ Natural theodicy. ” 
  28   A particular concern in  D.  Edwards ,  “ Every Sparrow that Falls to the Ground: The 
Cost of Evolution and the Christ- Event , ”  Ecotheology  11 . 1 ( 2006 ):  103 – 23 . 
  29   J.  Hick ,  Evil and the God of Love ( London :  Palgrave Macmillan , 2010 [ 1970] ). 
  30   W.   J.  Wildman ,  “ Incongruous Goodness, Perilous Beauty, Disconcerting Truth: Ultimate 
Reality and Suffering in Nature . ” In  Physics and Cosmology: Scientifi c Perspectives 
on the Problem of Evil in Nature . Ed.  N.  Murphy ,  R. J.  Russell , and  W.   G.  Stoeger , SJ 
( Vatican City and Berkeley, CA:  Vatican Observatory and Center for Theology and the 
Natural Sciences ,  2007) ,  267 – 94 . 
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 embodied 31  creaturely selves, which can only arise within an evolv-
ing world, are capable, once they have so arisen, of being transformed 
to a state in which they fl ourish without the possibility of suffering, 
but they cannot arise except within a world constrained by natural 
processes such as thermodynamics and natural selection. 
 Again, this can only be a guess, but it is the guess that fi ts best the sci-
entifi c and theological constraints within which cosmic theodicy must 
operate. 
 Further questions arise about the nature and scope of the redeemed 
life of creatures. Will it be simply an  ‘ objective immortality ’ in which all 
that is of value from individual lives is held within the loving memory 
of God, or will there be subjective experience? In 1987, Rolston intro-
duced the example of the  ‘ insurance ’ pelican chick, the second chick 
hatched by the white pelican, which is normally pushed out of the 
nest and starves. It is only  ‘ needed ’ when the older chick fails to thrive. 
Rolston ’ s comment that if God watches over the insurance chick, he 
does so from a vast distance, was rejected by Jay McDaniel, who pro-
pounded the notion of  ‘ pelican heaven ’ as an expression of a subjective, 
redeemed experience for such victims of evolution. 32  Indeed, subjective 
immortality for creatures seems more in keeping with Christian visions 
of the eschaton. It is also more in keeping with the logic of Johnson ’ s 
notion of  ‘ deep resurrection ’ . 33  But it is extremely difficult to gain much 
traction in speculations as to whether only  ‘ victims ’ or every sentient 
creature or indeed every creature receives redeemed life (or indeed how 
predators will be themselves in such a life). 34  
 The Problem of Providence 
 A dimension of the problem of cosmic theodicy not yet touched on 
concerns God ’ s providential action. Christian theologies picture God 
as immanently and lovingly present to all created entities and usu-
ally as acting selectively, providentially, in the physical world and the 
lives of certain creatures to bring about divine purposes. There is a very 
  31   As opposed to forms of spiritual being, such as angels. 
  32   H.  Rolston , III,  Science and Religion: A Critical Survey ( Philadelphia and London : 
 Templeton Foundation Press ,  2006 [1987]);  J.  B.  McDaniel ,  Of God and Pelicans: 
A Theology of Reverence for Life ( Louisville, KY:  Westminster John Knox Press , 
 1989) . 
  33   This takes up Gregersen ’ s notion of  ‘ deep incarnation ’ , which he introduced in  “ The 
Cross of Christ ” ; on deep resurrection, see Johnson,  Ask the Beasts , 208 – 10. 
  34   For a set of speculations, see Southgate,  Groaning of Creation , ch. 5. 
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extensive literature on such divine action. 35  What is striking is how the 
contemporary debate is focusing more and more on the interaction with 
theodicy; if God interacts with a single situation to benefi t a single group 
of creatures, does this not place a moral responsibility on God to bene-
fi t similar creatures in other similar situations? Yet the world abounds 
with situations in which God seems not to have helped creatures. This 
question has been taken up with particular honesty by Wesley Wildman, 
whose conclusion is that it is wrong to regard the divine as benevolent. 36  
Philip Clayton and Steven Knapp have concluded that God cannot, mor-
ally, act to change some physical situations but not others (their  ‘ not 
even once ’ principle, which they apply tellingly to the case of the 2004 
tsunami). Rather, they believe that God ’ s action can be expressed in 
terms of encouragement and lure towards virtue. 37  
 It is hard to reconcile this with the providential action within the 
human world described in Scripture and tradition, not least God ’ s rais-
ing of Jesus from the dead. 38  But when one turns to the relationship 
between God and non- human creatures over the whole sweep of evolu-
tion, it may be that God ’ s providential engagement is best understood in 
terms of loving, compassionate presence and lure rather than more overt 
intervention in the chain of physical causes. In William Rowe ’ s famous 
example of the fawn suffering horribly through being trapped in a forest 
fi re, 39  it is possible to accept that God companions each suffering fawn, 
but not necessary (and deeply problematic) to imagine God saving one 
specifi c fawn while letting others perish in agony. 
 It is also reasonable to go on to suppose that the divine presence 
expresses God ’ s love for creatures and therefore also that God suffers 
  35   K.  Ward ,  Divine Action: Examining God ’ s Role in an Open and Emergent Universe 
(West Conshohocken, PA: Templeton Foundation Press ,  2007 [1990]);  R.   J.  Russell ,  N. 
 Murphy , and  W.   R.  Stoeger , SJ (eds.),  Scientifi c Perspective on Divine Action: Twenty 
Years of Challenge and Progress ( Vatican City and Berkeley, CA:  Vatican Observatory 
and the Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences ,  2008) ;  D.  Edwards ,  How God 
Acts: Creation, Redemption, and Special Divine Action ( Minneapolis, MN :  Fortress 
Press ,  2010) ;  C.  Southgate ,  “ A Test Case  – Divine Action . ” In  God, Humanity and the 
Cosmos: A Textbook in Science and Religion . Ed.  C.  Southgate ( London :  Bloomsbury , 
3rd edn,  2011) ,  274 – 312 . 
  36   Wildman,  “ Incongruous Goodness. ” 
  37   P.  Clayton and  S.  Knapp ,  The Predicament of Belief:  Science, Philosophy, Faith 
( New York :  Oxford University Press ,  2011) . 
  38   Clayton and Knapp,  Predicament , ch. 5. 
  39   W.  L.  Rowe ,  “ Friendly Atheism, Skeptical Theism, and the Problem of Evil , ”  Int. J. 
Philos. Relig.  59 ( 2006 ):  79 – 92 . Rowe ’ s critique of theodicies is taken up in  N.  Trakakis , 
 The God beyond Belief: In Defence of William Rowe ’ s Evidential Argument from Evil 
( Dordrecht :  Springer ,  2007) . 
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with the suffering of creatures that suffer. Since we have no idea what 
the inner experience of other creatures feels like to them, we can have no 
idea how the compassionate presence of God might make a difference. 
But it is a reasonable theological instinct that it does make a differ-
ence 40  and that no creature in this sense dies alone. It is also a reasonable 
instinct, though much contested, that this suffering makes a difference 
to God and that God suffers  ‘ in, with and under ’ 41  the suffering of crea-
tures. 42  This commitment of God to creatures ’ pain fi nds its epitome in 
the Passion of Christ, which in recent thinking must be seen as identifi -
cation not only with human suffering but with all creatures. 43  
 This sense of the role of the Cross and the Atonement may lead to 
a refi nement of the only- way argument. I have given reasons to suppose 
that God was constrained in how to create a universe if it was to be fruit-
ful for life, for intelligent life, for the extraordinary range and beauty of 
life as we know it. But it may be that an additional constraint existed, 
that the cosmos must be such as to give rise to a life form that could 
incarnate the life of God, as Christians believe that Jesus did, and inaugu-
rate the era of redemption that will culminate in a state in which  ‘ there 
will be no more crying ’ for  ‘ God will be all in all ’ (Rev. 21.4; 1. Cor. 15.28). 
 To understand the full possibilities of such a cosmic theodicy, it is 
important to clarify the shape of the narrative that is being proposed. 
Scholars who insist of the necessity of a fall event sometimes argue as 
follows:  for the Cross of Jesus to be required to transform the world, 
which originally was created  ‘ very good ’ (Gen. 1.31), that world must 
have been subject to corruption. Fiddes refers to this as a  ‘ U- shaped ’ nar-
rative and points out that this is not the only possible narrative shape. 44  
Rather, what an evolutionary view has to propose is that the world is 
not so much corrupted as intrinsically (and necessarily)  limited , unable 
to transcend itself until the Incarnation, Passion, and Resurrection of the 
divine Son make that self- transcendence possible. A further step in the 
  40   Southgate,  “ Does God ’ s Care Make Any Difference? Theological Refl ection on the 
Suffering of God ’ s Creatures. ” In  Christian Faith and the Earth: Current Paths and 
Emerging Horizons in Ecotheology . Ed. E.    M. Conradie, S.  Bergmann, C.  Deane- 
Drummond, and D. Edwards (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), 97 – 114. 
  41   A.  Peacocke ,  “ Kenotic Creation and Divine Action . ” In  The Work of Love: Creation 
as Kenosis . Ed.  J.  Polkinghorne ( London, Grand Rapids, MI, and Cambridge :  SPCK and 
Eerdmans ,  2001) ,  21 – 42 . 
  42   For the debate about whether God can suffer, such a signifi cant element in contempo-
rary theodicy, see  P.  Fiddes ,  Participating in God: A Pastoral Doctrine of the Trinity 
( London :  Darton, Longman and Todd ,  2000) . 
  43   Gregersen,  “ The Cross of Christ. ” 
  44   P.  Fiddes ,  Freedom and Limit: A Dialogue between Literature and Christian Doctrine 
( Macon, GA :  Mercer University Press ,  1999) , ch. 3. 
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argument is the one at which Paul the Apostle hints in that extraordinary 
passage about the cosmos, Rom. 8.19 – 22. Paul claims there that the 
whole creation awaits  ‘ the freedom of the glory of the children of God ’ 
(8.21). This gives support to a narrative in which the fi nal transforma-
tion of the cosmos awaits the free loving human response to the initia-
tive of God in Christ. Only then will the world see that eschatological 
state from which pain and struggle has been eliminated. 45  
 The further question of how this narrative of creation and salva-
tion would interact with that of another planetary biosphere, if there 
were intelligent life elsewhere in the universe, is one that is attract-
ing increasing attention from theologians. 46  It would certainly bear 
on the issue of cosmic theodicy in the following ways. First, it would 
shed light on whether indeed life could form out of a signifi cantly dif-
ferent chemistry and whether less suffering would transpire in such a 
world. All I have said earlier sheds some doubt on the former possibil-
ity and major doubt on the latter. Second, it would lead to challenging 
questions for Christian theologians about the potential intersection 
of two narratives of salvation. Is it the work of Jesus of Nazareth 
that heals the whole cosmos, or would each civilization have its own 
incarnation? 
 Conclusion 
 This chapter has focused on the suffering that arises from the natural 
processes of the world. I have shown that Christian theology needs to 
part company with explanations of such suffering based on a fall event 
and have explored instead the very difficult territory of accepting that 
these were the only types of processes by which God could give rise to 
the values we see in this world. I suggested further that this theodicy at 
the level of systems must be complemented by an emphasis on eschato-
logical redemption of creatures and on God ’ s compassionate relating to 
them in their suffering. 
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